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Abstract: We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the
social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played
some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new players are born from parents who played in
the past. We consider two-player games with two strategies and a unique mixed evolutionarily stable
strategy. We show that in the first type of dynamics, it is asymptotically stable for small time delays
and becomes unstable for big ones when the population oscillates around its stationary state. In the
second type of dynamics, however, evolutionarily stable strategy is asymptotically stable for any size
of a time delay.
Keywords: Replicator dynamics; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Asymptotic stability; Time delay
Corresponding author: Jacek Mie¸kisz, e-mail: miekisz@mimuw.edu.pl, phone: 48-22-5544423, fax:
48-22-5544300.
1
STABILITY OF EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES IN DISCRETE REPLICATOR DYNAMICS WITH TIME DELAY2
1. Introduction
The evolution of populations can be often described within game-theoretic models. The pioneer of
such approach, John Maynard Smith, introduced the fundamental notion of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (1974, 1982). If everybody plays such a strategy, then the small number of mutants playing a
different strategy is eliminated from the population. The dynamical interpretation of the evolutionarily
stable strategy was later provided in (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer et al., 1979; Zeeman, 1981). A
system of differential or difference equations, the so-called replicator equations, were proposed. They
describe the time-evolution of frequencies of strategies. It is known that any evolutionarily stable
strategy is an asymptotically stable stationary point of such dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988);
Weibull, 1997). In fact, in two-player games with two strategies, a state of population is evolutionarily
stable if and only if it is asymptotically stable.
Recently Tao and Wang (1997) investigated the effect of a time delay on the stability of interior
stationary points of the replicator dynamics. They considered a two-player game with two strategies
and a unique asymptotically stable interior stationary point. They proposed a certain form of a time-
delay differential replicator equation. They showed that the mixed evolutionarily stable strategy is
stable if a time delay is small. For sufficiently large delays it becomes unstable.
Here we discuss discrete-time replicator dynamics. We introduce a time delay in two different
ways. In the so-called social model, we assume that players imitate a strategy with the higher average
payoff, taking into account time-delayed information. When the limit of zero time interval is taken,
one obtains equations discussed by Tao and Wang (1997). In the so-called biological model, we assume
that the number of players born in a given time is proportional to payoffs received by their parents in
a certain moment in the past. We analyze the stability of the interior stationary point in our discrete
time-delay replicator dynamics. In the first model, we prove results analogous to those of Tao and
Wang (1997). However, in our second model, we show the stability of the interior point for any value
of the time delay. We prove our results in an elementary way, that is without any reference to the
theory of time-delay equations.
In Section 2, we present our discrete-time replicator dynamics with two types of time delay. In
Section 3, we discuss a model with a social-type time delay and in Section 4, with a biological-type
time delay. Discussion follows in Section 5. Proofs are given in Appendix A and B.
2. Replicator dynamics
We assume that our population is haploid, that is the offspring have identical phenotypic strategies
as their parents (we assume that there are two different pure strategies; denote them by A and B). In
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discrete moments of time, individuals compete in pairwise contests and the outcome is given by the
following payoff matrix:
A B
A a b
U =
B c d,
where the ij entry, i, j = A,B, is the payoff of the first (row) player when he plays the strategy
i and the second (column) player plays the strategy j. We assume that both players are the same
and hence payoffs of the column player are given by the matrix transposed to U ; such games are
called symmetric. From now on we will assume that c > a and b > d so there exists a unique mixed
evolutionarily stable strategy, x∗ = δ2
δ
, where δ1 = c − a, δ2 = b − d, and δ = δ1 + δ2. x
∗ is the
equilibrium fraction of an infinite population playing A.
We will first discuss replicator dynamics without a time delay. We assume that during the small
time interval ǫ, only an ǫ fraction of the population takes part in pairwise competitions, that is plays
games. Let pi(t), i = A,B, be the number of individuals playing at the time t the strategy A and
B respectively, p(t) = pA(t) + pB(t) the total number of players and x(t) =
p1(t)
p(t) a fraction of the
population playing A. We write
pi(t+ ǫ) = (1− ǫ)pi(t) + ǫpi(t)Ui(t); i = A,B, (2.1)
where UA(t) = ax(t)+ b(1−x(t)) and UB(t) = cx(t)+ d(1−x(t)) are average payoffs of individuals
playing A and B respectively. We assume that all payoffs are not smaller than 0 hence pA and pB are
always nonnegative and therefore 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The equation for the total number of players reads
p(t+ ǫ) = (1− ǫ)p(t) + ǫp(t)U¯(t), (2.2)
where U¯(t) = x(t)UA(t) + (1 − x(t))UB(t) is the average payoff in the population. When we divide
(2.1) by (2.2) we obtain an equation for the frequency of the strategy A,
x(t+ ǫ)− x(t) = ǫ
x(t)[UA(t)− U¯(t)]
1− ǫ+ ǫU¯(t)
. (2.3)
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Now we divide both sides of (2.3) by ǫ, perform the limit ǫ → 0, and obtain the well known
differential replicator equation,
dx(t)
dt
= x(t)[UA(t)− U¯(t)]. (2.4)
The above equation can also be written as
dx(t)
dt
= x(t)(1 − x(t))[UA(t)− UB(t)] = −δx(t)(1 − x(t))(x(t) − x
∗). (2.5)
It follows that x∗ is the globally (except the boundary points x = 0 and x = 1) asymptotically
stable stationary point of (2.5).
In the following two sections we will study the stability of x∗ in the replicator dynamics with
different forms of the time delay.
3. Social-type time delay
Here we assume that individuals at time t replicate due to average payoffs obtained by their strategies
at time t− τ for some delay τ > 0 (see also a discussion after (3.6)).
We propose the following equations:
pi(t+ ǫ) = (1− ǫ)pi(t) + ǫpi(t)Ui(t− τ); i = A,B. (3.1)
Then for the total number of players we get
p(t+ ǫ) = (1− ǫ)p(t) + ǫp(t)U¯o(t− τ), (3.2)
where U¯o(t− τ) = x(t)UA(t− τ) + (1− x(t))UB(t− τ).
We divide (3.1) by (3.2) and obtain an equation for the frequency of the strategy A,
x(t+ ǫ)− x(t) = ǫ
x(t)[UA(t− τ)− U¯o(t− τ)]
1− ǫ+ ǫU¯o(t− τ)
(3.3)
and after some rearrangements we get
x(t+ ǫ)− x(t) = −ǫx(t)(1− x(t))[x(t− τ)− x∗]
δ
1− ǫ+ ǫU¯o(t− τ)
. (3.4)
Now the corresponding replicator dynamics in the continuous time reads
dx(t)
dt
= x(t)[UA(t− τ)− U¯o(t− τ)] (3.5)
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and can also be written as
dx(t)
dt
= x(t)(1− x(t))[UA(t− τ)− UB(t− τ)] = −δx(t)(1 − x(t))(x(t− τ)− x
∗). (3.6)
The first equation in (3.6) can be also interpreted as follows. Assume that randomly chosen players
imitate randomly chosen opponents. Then the probability that a player who played A would imitate
the opponent who played B at time t is exactly x(t)(1− x(t)). The intensity of imitation depends on
the delayed information about the difference of corresponding payoffs at time t− τ . We will therefore
say that such models have a social-type time delay.
Equations (3.5-3.6) are exactly the time-delay replicator dynamics proposed and analyzed by Tao
and Wang (1997). They showed that if τ < δπ/2δ1δ2, then the mixed evolutionarily stable strategy,
x∗, is asymptotically stable. When τ increases beyond the bifurcation value δπ/2δ1δ2, x
∗ becomes
unstable. We will show in Appendix A analogous results for our discrete equation (3.4). Our proofs
will be elementary - we will not refer to the theory of time-delay equations. In particular, we will
show that for any large enough time delay, τ , x(t) oscillates around x∗.
4. Biological-type time delay
Here we assume that individuals born at time t−τ are able to take part in contests when they become
mature at time t or equivalently they are born τ units of time after their parents played and received
payoffs. We propose the following equations:
pi(t+ ǫ) = (1− ǫ)pi(t) + ǫpi(t− τ)Ui(t− τ); i = A,B. (4.1)
Then the equation for the total number of players reads
p(t+ ǫ) = (1− ǫ)p(t) + ǫp(t)[
x(t)pA(t− τ)
pA(t)
UA(t− τ) +
(1− x(t))pB(t− τ)
pB(t)
UB(t− τ)]. (4.2)
We divide (4.1) by (4.2) and obtain an equation for the frequency of the first strategy,
x(t+ ǫ)− x(t) = ǫ
x(t− τ)UA(t− τ)− x(t)U¯(t− τ)
(1− ǫ) p(t)
p(t−τ) + ǫU¯(t− τ)
, (4.3)
where U¯(t− τ) = x(t− τ)UA(t− τ) + (1− x(t− τ))UB(t− τ). We will prove in Appendix B that x
∗ is
asymptotically stable for any value of the time delay τ . Here we will show our result in the following
simple example.
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The payoff matrix is given by U =
(
0 1
1 0
)
hence x∗ = 12 is the mixed evolutionarily stable strategy
which is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics without time delay. The equation (4.3) now
reads
x(t+ ǫ)− x(t) = ǫ
x(t− τ)(1− x(t− τ))− 2x(t)x(t− τ)(1 − x(t− τ))
(1− ǫ) p(t)
p(t−τ) + 2ǫx(t− τ)(1− x(t− τ))
. (4.4)
After simple algebra we get
x(t+ ǫ)−
1
2
+
1
2
− x(t) = ǫ(1− 2x(t))
x(t− τ)(1− x(t− τ))
(1 − ǫ) p(t)
p(t−τ) + 2ǫx(t− τ)(1 − x(t− τ))
, (4.5)
x(t+ ǫ)−
1
2
= (x(t)−
1
2
)
1
1 + ǫp(t−τ)(1−ǫ)p(t)2x(t− τ)(1 − x(t− τ))
hence
|x(t+ ǫ)−
1
2
| < |x(t)−
1
2
|. (4.6)
It follows that x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
5. Discussion
We proposed and analyzed certain forms of discrete-time replicator dynamics with a time delay. We
introduced the time delay on the level of the number of individuals playing different strategies and
not on the level of their relative frequencies. We showed that the stability of a mixed evolutionarily
stable strategy depends on the particular form of the time delay.
It would be interesting to analyze time-delay replicator models taking into account the limited
capacity of an environment (for example in the form of a logistic equation) and stochastic effects
resulting from mutations and a random character of interactions. In the latter case, individuals
play with particular opponents and not against the average strategy like in the standard replicator
dynamics.
Acknowledgments JM would like to thank the Polish Committee for Scientific Research for a finan-
cial support under the grant KBN 5 P03A 025 20.
Appendix A.
Theorem 1. x∗ is asymptotically stable in the dynamics (3.4) if τ is sufficiently small and unstable
for large enough τ .
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Proof: We will assume that τ is a multiple of ǫ, τ = mǫ for some natural number m. Observe first
that if x(t− τ) < x∗, then x(t + ǫ) > x(t), and if x(t − τ) > x∗, then x(t+ ǫ) < x(t). Let us assume
first that there is t′ such that x(t′), x(t′ − ǫ), x(t′ − 2ǫ), ..., x(t′ − τ) < x∗. Then x(t), t ≥ t′ increases
up to the moment t1 for which x(t1 − τ) > x
∗. If such t1 does not exist then x(t) →t→∞ x
∗ and the
theorem is proved. Now we have x∗ < x(t1 − τ) < x(t1 − τ + ǫ) < . . . < x(t1) and x(t1 + ǫ) < x(t1)
so t1 is a turning point. Now x(t) decreases up to the moment t2 for which x(t2 − τ) < x
∗. Again,
if such t2 does not exist, then the theorem follows. Therefore let us assume that there is an infinite
sequence, ti, of such turning points. Let ηi = |x(ti)− x
∗|. We will show that ηi →i→∞ 0.
For t ∈ {ti, ti + ǫ, . . . , ti+1 − 1} we have the following bound for x(t+ ǫ)− x(t):
|x(t+ ǫ)− x(t)| <
1
4
ηi
ǫδ
1− ǫ+ ǫU¯o(t− τ)
. (A.1)
This means that
ηi+1 < (m+ 1)ǫKηi, (A.2)
where K is the maximal possible value of δ
4(1−ǫ+ǫU¯o(t−τ))
. We get that if
τ <
1
K
− ǫ, (A.3)
then ηi →i→∞ 0 so x(t) converges to x
∗.
Now if for every t, |x(t + ǫ) − x∗| < maxk∈{0,1,...,m} |x(t − kǫ) − x
∗|, then x(t) converges to x∗.
Therefore assume that there is t′′ such that |x(t′′ + ǫ) − x∗| ≥ maxk∈{0,1,...,m} |x(t
′′ − kǫ) − x∗|. If τ
satisfies (A.3), then it follows that x(t + ǫ), ..., x(t + ǫ + τ) are all on the same side of x∗ and the
first part of the proof can be applied. We showed that x(t) converges to x∗ for any initial conditions
different from 0 and 1 hence x∗ is globally asymptotically stable.
Now we will show that x∗ is unstable for any large enough τ .
Let γ > 0 be arbitrarily small and consider a following perturbation of the stationary point x∗:
x(t) = x∗, t ≤ 0 and x(ǫ) = x∗ + γ. It folows from (3.4) that x(kǫ) = x(ǫ) for k = 1, ...,m + 1. Let
K ′ = minx∈[x∗−γ,x∗+γ]
x(1−x)δ
4(1−ǫ+ǫU¯o(t−τ))
. If m2 ǫK
′γ > 2γ, that is τ > 4
K ′
, then it follows from (3.4) that
after m/2 steps (we assume without loss of generality that m is even) x((m + 1 +m/2)ǫ) < x∗ − γ.
In fact we have x((2m + 1)ǫ) < . . . < x((m + 1)ǫ) and at least m/2 of x′s in this sequence are
smaller than x∗ − γ. Let t¯ > (2m + 1)ǫ be the smallest t such that x(t) > x∗ − γ. Then we have
x(t¯ −mǫ), . . . , x(t¯ − ǫ) < x∗ − γ < x(t¯) hence after m/2 steps, x(t) crosses x∗ + γ and the situation
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repeats itself. We showed that if
τ >
4
K ′
, (A.4)
then there exists an infinite sequence, t˜i, such that |x(t˜i) − x
∗| > γ and therefore x∗ is unstable.
Moreover, x(t) oscillates around x∗.
Appendix B.
Theorem 2. x∗ is asymptotically stable for any τ in the dynamics (4.3).
Proof: Let ct =
x(t)UA(t)
U¯(t)
. Observe that if x(t) < x∗, then ct > x(t), if x(t) > x
∗, then ct < x(t), and
if x(t) = x∗, then ct = x
∗. We can write (4.3) as
x(t+ ǫ)− x(t) = ǫ
x(t− τ)UA(t− τ)− ct−τ U¯(t− τ) + ct−τ U¯(t− τ)− x(t)U¯ (t− τ)
(1− ǫ) p(t)
p(t−τ) + ǫU¯(t− τ)
(B.1)
and after some rearrangements we obtain
x(t+ ǫ)− ct−τ = (x(t)− ct−τ )
1
1 + ǫp(t−τ)(1−ǫ)p(t) U¯(t− τ)
. (B.2)
We get that at time t+ ǫ, x is closer to ct−τ than at time t and it is on the same side of ct−τ . We
will show that c is an increasing or a constant function of x. Let us calculate the derivative of c with
respect to x.
c′ =
f(x)
(xUA + (1− x)UB)2
, (B.3)
where
f(x) = (ac+ bd− 2ad)x2 + 2d(a− b)x+ bd. (B.4)
A simple analysis shows that f > 0 on (0, 1) or f = 0 on (0, 1) (in the case of a = d = 0). Hence
c(x) is either an increasing or a constant function of x. In the latter case, ∀xc(x) = x
∗, as it happens
in our example in Section 4, and the theorem follows.
We will now show that
|x(t+ τ + ǫ)− x∗| < max{|x(t)− x∗|, |x(t+ τ)− x∗|} (B.5)
hence x(t) converges to x∗ for any initial conditions different from 0 and 1 so x∗ is globally asymptot-
ically stable.
If x(t) < x∗ and x(t+ τ) < x∗, then x(t) < ct ≤ x
∗ and also x(t+ τ) < ct+τ ≤ x
∗. From (B.2) we
obtain
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

x (t+ τ) < x (t+ τ + ǫ) < ct if x (t+ τ) < ct
x (t) < x (t+ τ + ǫ) = ct if x (t+ τ) = ct
x (t) < ct < x (t+ τ + ǫ) < x (t+ τ) if x (t+ τ) > ct
hence (B.5) holds.
If x (t) > x∗ and x (t+ τ) < x∗, then x (t+ τ) < x∗ < ct < x (t) and either x (t+ τ) < x (t+ τ + ǫ) <
x∗ or x∗ < x (t+ τ + ǫ) < ct which means that (B.5) holds.
The cases of x (t) > x∗, x (t+ τ) > x∗ and x (t) < x∗, x (t+ τ) < x∗ can be treated analogously.
We showed that (B.5) holds.
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